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The paper deals with the choice of the nominal euro conversion rates for the acceding 
countries upon their accession to EMU. The paper reviews theoretical models of equilibrium 
exchange rates as well as discusses their interpretation and the ensuing policy recommendations. 
Problems with empirical estimations of existing models are addressed. It is argued that despite 
several equilibrium exchange rate theories not all of them are useful for the real policy choice of 
the nominal conversion rate. This and the intrinsic uncertainty of equilibrium exchange rate 
estimates lead to the conclusion that the range of “optimal” euro conversion rates is quiet wide 
and other issues must be taken into account. In particular, a smooth transition to the euro 
conversion rate and minimisation of risks of potential shocks to the economy should be the key 
concern. Consequently, recommendations for the selection of nominal conversion rates are 
largely dependent on the current exchange rate regime.  
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1. Introduction 
In May 2004, ten countries: Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia1 are expected to join the European Union (EU). As EU members 
they will be obliged to enter European Monetary Union (EMU). The opt-out option (as in the case of 
the UK and Denmark) will not be available to them.  
The standard path of accession to EMU requires staying in the ERM II system for at least two 
years and fulfilling Maastricht convergence criteria. Under the ERM II a candidate country’s 
currency has to stay within +/-15% band against the euro central parity. The central exchange rate 
cannot be devalued and it could be adopted as the irrevocable fixing rate in EMU. Some 
revaluation is, however, possible during final negotiations between the acceding country and the 
European Central Bank (ECB). In this context an issue of choosing the appropriate fixing exchange 
rate and exchange rate regime strategy arises.  
In 1999, countries that took part in stage III of the EMU establishment fixed their currencies to 
the euro at their ERM parities. They were initially set before 1979 and then devalued on several 
occasions. In the case of the UK, which joined the ERM in 1990, the conversion rate was chosen 
based on the purchasing parity criterion (MacDonald, 2000). What should be the strategy for 
current acceding countries? 
A general view is that the central parity should reflect an equilibrium exchange rate (Buiter, 
1999). However, adoption of this wisdom is not straightforward as no universal concept of 
equilibrium exchange rate exists. Each approach has different theoretical framework and therefore 
different policy implications. In order to have a meaningful discussion over the choice of the 
appropriate exchange rate, equilibrium conditions must be clearly defined. 
Against this background this paper investigates various issues related to the choice of the 
nominal conversion rates upon the entry to EMU for acceding countries. It starts with the review of 
the evolution of exchange rate regimes in the countries under the investigation, as this factor is 
claimed to be important in this context. Then, a general background to the discussion on fixing 
nominal exchange rates in EMU is outlined in Section 3. Given several concepts of theoretical 
models of equilibrium exchange rates, they are shortly reviewed in Section 4 in the context of 
choosing nominal conversion rates. Section 5 deals with problems of testing and practical 
implementation of these models. As usefulness of some theoretical equilibrium exchange rate 
models and precision of their estimates raise some reservations, other important issues that should 
be taken into account in making the decision on the conversion rate are discussed in Section 6. 
Finally, all arguments are summarised and conclusions are drawn in Section 7.  
                                                  
1 Empirical and statistical analyses covered in this paper will also refer to the acceding countries (Bulgaria and 
Romania). For the sake of brevity, the term “acceding countries” used in this paper will refer to both acceding and 
accession countries. Not all acceding  economies are covered in statistical analyses due to the lack of data.   
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2.  Exchange rate regimes in acceding countries 
Prior to tackling the question of choosing the conversion rate upon the accession to EMU a 
description of the exchange rate regimes among acceding countries will be presented. Acceding 
countries adopted a wide range of different exchange rate regimes that in some cases underwent a 
significant evolution.  
First, it must be stressed that a clear-cut classification of exchange rate regimes poses some 
problems. This especially applies to a free floating regime as its pure form is rather rare in the real 
world. As Calvo and Reinhart (2002) have suggested, many economies exhibit ‘fear of floating’ and 
in practice use interest rate and intervention policies whose effect is to steer nominal exchange 
rates. Thus, the problem of exchange rate regime classification boils down to a comparison of de 
facto and de jure exchange rate policies. On the other hand, fixed peg exchange rate regimes are 
more transparent given their institutional frameworks in the form of either currency board 
arrangement, adoption of foreign currency (e.g. dollarisation) or conventional peg to one specific 
foreign currency or a basket of foreign currencies. 
At the beginning of the transformation process in some acceding countries in the early 1990s 
when high inflation was pervasive and stabilisation policies had to be put in place, many countries 
resorted to fixed pegs, but in the course of the transition they gradually moved towards more 
flexible exchange rate regimes. This was the case of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak 
Republic as well as Romania, and was consistent with a general global trend.  
In the Czech Republic a pegged exchange rate regime was in place since 1993 until 1997. In 
1993, the koruna was pegged to the basket of the German mark and US dollar with a narrow 
fluctuations band. The band was gradually widened over this period. In 1997, on the event of the 
financial crisis the koruna was devalued and the inflation-targeting framework coupled with free 
floating exchange rate regime was introduced. 
In Hungary, since 1989 the forint was pegged to the basket of currencies – composition of 
currencies in the basket and their weights were subject to changes over time. Along these changes 
the fluctuations band was gradually widened from 0.3% in 1992 to 2.5% in 1994. On many 
occasions the forint was discretionally devalued. In May 1995, a system of pre-announced monthly 
devaluation rates was introduced. In January 2000, the euro became the only reference currency 
and in May 2001 the fluctuation band was extended to 15%. Consequently, the exchange rate 
regime became compatible with the ERMII mechanism. In June 2003, the central parity was 
devalued from 276.1 to 282.36 HUF/EUR.  
Cyprus, like Hungary, adopts currently a unilateral peg to the euro with a 15% fluctuation band 
which is compatible with the ERMII. The central parity rate is set at 1.7086 CYP/EUR. 
Poland also began the transition period with a fixed peg regime. At the beginning of 1990 the 
Polish zloty was pegged to the US dollar and then in May 1991 to a currency basket, which 
consisted of the US dollar, German mark, British pound, French and Swiss francs. Before the end 
of 1991, the fixed peg was replaced with the crawling peg regime with a preannounced monthly  
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devaluation rate. The devaluation rate was lowered gradually from 1.8% to 0.3% in March 1999. At 
the same time the fluctuation band was widened from 0.5% to 15% in 1999. Upon the introduction 
of a euro at the beginning of 1999 the currency basket was amended to comprise the euro (55%) 
and the US dollar (45%) only. During the period with the crawling peg, the zloty was devalued 
discretionally several times. Finally, after the introduction of direct inflation targeting framework in 
1999 the zloty was fully floated in April 2000. 
In the Slovak Republic, the Slovak koruna was fixed to a multi-currency basket over the period 
January 1993 – October 1998. Until 1995, the fluctuation band was very narrow (+/-1.5%). Only in 
January 1996 the band was widened to 3%, then to 5% in July and finally to 7% in January 1997. 
Since July 1994, the currency basket included the German mark and the US dollar (60% and 40%, 
respectively). In October 1998, the currency basket peg and fluctuation band were abolished. 
Despite floating of the Slovak koruna the national bank used to intervene in the foreign exchange 
market. 
From the very beginning of the transition Romania has pursued officially a free floating regime, 
but in reality it targeted the leu exchange rate. The management of the exchange rate was 
especially tight during periods of significant macroeconomic imbalances (Nerlich, 2002). Given low 
foreign reserves the introduction of a fixed peg was not possible. Informally, the US dollar and euro 
are the reference currencies.  
Unlike the countries described above Slovenia remained with the exchange rate regime 
broadly unchanged since the beginning of the 1990s. Since 1991, the tolar has been closely 
managed on a gradually depreciating path. Currently the euro is used as an informal reference 
currency.  
The second distinctive group of countries in CEE went for fixed peg regimes that have been 
sustained so far. This was the case of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Estonia in 1992 introduced 
the currency board arrangement and pegged its kroon to the German mark at the rate 8 EEK/DEM 
and in 1999 it was re-pegged to the euro at the rate of 15.6466 EEK/EUR.  
Lithuania went for a currency board type arrangement and in 1994 the litas was fixed to the 
dollar. In February 2002, it was re-pegged to the euro at the rate of 3.4528 LTL/EUR. Both in 
Estonia and Lithuania central bank authorities hold the view that the current fixing exchange rates 
should be sustained with a zero band in ERM II. 
In 1997, the currency board arrangement was also established in Bulgaria in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis. The Bulgarian lev was pegged to the German mark at 1:1 and upon the 
introduction of euro in 1999 re-pegged to the euro at the rate of 1.9558 BGN/EUR. Before the 1997 
crisis, the exchange rate regime in Bulgaria was perceived as a relatively free float (Corker et al., 
2000).  
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Table 1. Fixing exchange rates  
  Current fixing rate 
Estonia (kroon)  15.6466 per euro 
Lithuania (litas)  3.4528 per euro 
Bulgaria (lev)  1.95583 per euro 
Latvia (lat)  0.7997 per SDR 
Cyprus (pound)  1.7086 per euro 
Source: National central banks. 
In Latvia, since February 1994 the fixed exchange rate policy has been pursued. The lat was 
pegged to the basket of SDR currencies2 (0.7997 LVL/SDR) with the normal fluctuation band of +/- 
1%. At the same time a very liberal policy of capital movements has been adopted. Barriers to 
capital movement were early removed and the unlimited convertibility of the national currency was 
introduced.  
The conventional fixed peg was also adopted by Malta. The Maltese lira is fixed to a basket 
consisting of the euro, dollar, and pound sterling. The allowed fluctuation band is only 0.25%.  
3.  EMU enlargement and conversion rates – a background 
Before turning to a discussion on the conversion rates upon EMU accession, several general 
remarks are made. They are intended to set the research goal into a proper perspective. First, 
joining EMU is not only about a change in the exchange rate regime and fixing domestic currencies 
at some constant rate to euro. EMU members use the common currency and have single monetary 
policy. The underlying notion of EMU integration refers to a concept of a single market with free 
movement of goods, capital and labour. These conditions are aimed at better economic efficiency, 
greater competitiveness and economic integration and in turn some price level convergence. Thus, 
although the issue of selecting conversion rates may seem important, there are many other 
aspects of the economic integration in EMU that will determine stable and robust growth 
performance. Given this ultimate long-term goal of better economic prospect, the importance of the 
choice of particular conversion rate should not be overestimated.  
Second, the EMU membership ultimately requires fixing the nominal exchange rate to the 
euro. Changes in nominal exchange rates are sensitive issues for economic policy given their 
impact on international competitiveness. This aspect usually dominates the whole discussion on 
exchange rates. Consequently, sectors directly exposed to international competition are primarily 
concerned3. Although a nominal exchange rate is only one of several determinants of international 
competitiveness (like prices, wages, prices of other production inputs, productivity, and profit 
margins, etc.) it is often believed to be a quick and effective remedy for problems with international 
                                                  
2 For definition see http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/sdr.htm . 
3 These are tradables being usually classified as manufacturing goods, some services that are easily traded 
internationally, and also agricultural commodities.  
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competitiveness. Consequently, the nominal exchange rate and not the real one is the bone of 
contention in political debates. Given some price and wage rigidities this bias is to some extent 
justified, though adjustments in prices to nominal exchange rate changes should not be ignored. In 
theory changes in nominal exchange rate should be offset by corresponding changes in prices and 
initial conditions restored. Ignoring these adjustments could lead to inappropriate policy 
conclusions. Although the fixing of nominal exchange rate in EMU is irrevocable4, the choice of the 
conversion rate by no means will have everlasting effects on an economy.   
Apparently, a change in nominal exchange rate and in the exchange rate regime has far wider 
effects for an economy than only for competitiveness in tradables and national prices. In the era of 
largely liberalised capital flows, it has a potentially important impact on foreign denominated assets 
and liabilities. Because acceding countries are indebted in foreign currencies this effect should not 
be ignored5. In addition, consequences for domestic price stability and investors’ confidence 
aspects should be also taken into account.  
Third, while setting a euro conversion rate in each acceding country the interactions with other 
currencies should be taken into account. This refers to the notion of global consistency in 
exchange rate models discussed among others in Isard and Faruqee (1998) and Alberola et al. 
(1999). In theoretical models two-country framework with one bilateral exchange rate works fine, 
but when it comes to empirical analysis in the real world with many currencies this might not be a 
good approach. Given this fact and possibility that many of the acceding countries will join EMU at 
the same time or in relatively short intervals, considerations of equilibrium between the euro and 
acceding countries’ currencies should be taken into account. When being mostly concerned about 
trade competitiveness, the number of currencies that should be incorporate into this analysis can 
be narrowed down to main trading partners. For most of acceding countries the EU (and euro 
zone) and the acceding countries themselves are the main trading partners (see Table A.2 and A.3 
in Annex 2). Consequently, it would be justified to focus only on mutual exchange rates among 
acceding countries and the euro zone. It should be stressed that setting the ‘internal’ exchange 
rate right in the enlarged euro zone does not have to require the euro to be in equilibrium vs. non-
EMU economies6. These two aspects could be treated as separate issues, and this paper will deal 
only with the former.  
                                                  
4 As for the moment there are no legal provisions in EMU for changing the conversion rate or exiting the monetary 
union. 
5 See Table A.5 in Annex 2. 
6 Conversion rates could be treated as “internal” equilibrium rates for a block of countries. The “external” equilibrium 
exchange rate of the euro vs. other currencies could be investigated only after the formation of the enlarge euro-zone 
and incorporation of economic information from EMU trading partners.   
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4.  Theoretical concepts of equilibrium exchange rate and the euro 
conversion rates 
The economic literature dealing with theories of equilibrium exchange rate and assessment of 
misalignment as well as empirical testing of these theories has been proliferating in recent years – 
see for instance Williamson (1994), Allen and Stein (1995), Montiel (1997), MacDonald and Stein 
(1999), MacDonald (2000), and Isard et al. (2001). In general three approaches can be 
distinguished: fundamental equilibrium exchange rate (FEER), behavioural equilibrium exchange 
rate (BEER), and natural real exchange rate (NATREX). All of these concepts will be briefly 
discussed in order to be able to assess their usefulness in the context of the conversion rate 
choice.  
The notion of FEER, popularised by Williamson (1985), is based on the concept of internal and 
external macroeconomic equilibrium. The former is defined in terms of output at the full-
employment level as well as low and sustainable inflation, whereas the latter in terms of a 
sustainable and desired net flow of capital between countries that are internally balanced (Clark 
and MacDonald, 1999). The FEER indicates the exchange rate that would prevail under “ideal 
economic conditions”. Thus, this approach should be viewed as normative. It simply boils down to 
the calibration of the exchange rate at a set of well-defined economic conditions (Clark and 
MacDonald, 1999).  
The FEER approach states an equilibrium position that should be viewed as “statistic” one 
(MacDonald, 2000). Given its stock-flow inconsistency, it cannot represent true steady-state 
equilibrium. Wren-Lewis (1992) noted that the FEER approach assumes implicitly a convergence 
of the actual real effective exchange rate to its FEER value. Thus, a medium-run current account 
theory of exchange rate determination is embedded in this approach. It simply assumes that any 
divergence in an exchange rate will be eliminated, however the adjustment process is not explicitly 
demonstrated. The misalignment based on the FEER model should be interpreted as a 
misalignment resulting from the departure of macroeconomic variables from their fundamental-
equilibrium levels (defined in terms of the internal and external balance). In a sense, the FEER 
points to the ideal situation with implicit equilibrium in all markets.  
The behavioural equilibrium exchange rate (BEER) seeks explicitly relations between 
macroeconomic fundamentals and the exchange rate. Fundamentals are based on some 
theoretical framework and practically any exchange rate theory can be embedded in this approach. 
The estimation of BEER is usually done in a single-equation model, where real exchange rate is 
explained with eclectic fundamentals – based on various exchange rate theories like the balance of 
payments theory, Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect, uncovered interest parity, PPP, etc.7 For 
                                                  
7 The lack of a clearly defined underlining theoretical model and ad hoc selection of explanatory variables in some 
applications of BEER models was criticised by Stein (1999).  
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instance, Baffes et al. (1997) employed different factors – believed to be main determinants of 
exchange rate: terms of trade, indicator of economy openness (measured as imports plus exports 
over nominal GDP), resource balance to GDP (trade balance over GDP – in constant prices), 
investment share, whereas Clark and MacDonald (1999) – difference in real interest rates, relative 
government debt, relative ratios of tradables and nontradables prices, and net foreign assets.  
The estimated BEER provides information about the current misalignment. The latter term 
means a misalignment stemming from transitory and random effects, i.e. factors not treated as 
“fundamental” determinants of the exchange rate (MacDonald, 2000). The BEER method also 
makes it possible to calculate a “fundamental” equilibrium exchange rate and in turn the total 
misalignment (as in the notion of FEER). This concept was dubbed with acronym PEER – 
permanent equilibrium exchange rate and should be treated as a way of calibrating BEER at 
equilibrium values (MacDonald, 2000). For this purpose MacDonald (2000) uses the Gonzalo and 
Granger (1995) methodology, which allows for extraction of the permanent component from a 
vector of cointegrated variables in the Johansen cointegration system. This method does not have 
sound theoretical foundations and like the commonly used Hodrick-Prescott filter is mechanical in 
nature. Thus, the PEER decomposition allows for distinction to what extent a misalignment implied 
by the BEER is permanent or transitory.  
Another concept of equilibrium exchange rate is NATREX which shares some common 
features with both FEER and BEER models. This approach initiated by Stein (1990) and 
thoroughly discussed in Allen and Stein (1995) focuses on explanation of medium and long-run 
real equilibrium exchange rate. The acronym “natural” is motivated by the fact that the model 
assumes the exchange rate to converge “naturally” to its long-run equilibrium, i.e. it is a self 
equilibrating framework. The equilibrium exchange rate is defined as the rate that ensures the 
balance of payments equilibrium in the absence of cyclical factors, speculative capital movements 
and changes in international reserves (Gandolfo and Felettigh, 1998). As in the case of FEER the 
underlining notion refers to internal (an economy at its capacity output) and external equilibrium (in 
terms of the balance of payments). However, as opposed to FEER, the NATREX dynamic 
theoretical framework is stock-flow consistent and the shift from medium to long-run equilibrium 
could be demonstrated explicitly. The NATREX approach could be treated as a class of models. A 
particular form of this model can be constructed so as to reflect some specified features of a given 
economy (Gandolfo and Felettigh, 1998). The NATREX models are usually built around four 
blocks: the production function, investment function, social saving function, and balance of 
payments equation. The most commonly pursed method of empirical testing is exactly the same as 
for the BEER models, where real exchange rate is regressed on selected fundamentals. In the 
case of the NATREX approach, these fundamentals are derived explicitly form the reduced form 
equations of the underling model. There were also attempts to estimate the whole model of 
simultaneous equations directly (for instance Gandolfo and Felettigh, 1998).  
Finally, the purchasing power parity (PPP) model should be mentioned. It is a building block of 
many macroeconomic models and has been a subject of many theoretical and empirical  
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investigations. The PPP paradigm assumes that a nominal exchange rate of any two currencies 
should reflect closely relative purchasing powers of the two monetary units as represented by 
national price levels (Isard et al., 2001). The strong version of PPP requires that a nominal 
exchange rate and price ratio should be related exactly one for one. Consequently, the real 
exchange rate should be constant. In the weak version of PPP, the coefficient of price ratio could 
be different from one and the real exchange rate is expected to be only stationary (i.e. mean 
reverting). It should be mentioned that the PPP model should be rather treated as condition of 
international arbitrage and not as an exchange rate determination theory per se (see below).  
Having briefly surveyed selected concepts of equilibrium exchange rate their usefulness for 
choosing the euro conversion rates could be assessed. The “fundamental” concepts of equilibrium 
exchange rate (FEER, NATREX and PEER) assume explicitly that this rate is consistent with the 
internal and external equilibrium in the entire economy. They refer to long-term equilibrium 
exchange rates, and thus are not the most appropriate concepts of assessing the current 
misalignment. Although they are interesting theoretical concepts, they do not necessarily provide 
practical guidelines for short-term policy choices8. In the case of choosing the euro conversion rate 
it could be argued that it is not justified to base these rates on long-term equilibrium concepts. 
Such benchmarks implicitly assume that the economies are at long-term equilibrium (externally 
and internally balanced) and it would not make sense to expect the acceding countries to meet this 
condition when joining EMU. This could be a good long-term goal, but not a current reference 
point. In the context of setting nominal parity, it seems better to think about the “equilibrium 
exchange rate” as a level of exchange rate that is consistent with other macro variables for a given 
point in time and which does not have to be a steady state exchange rate in a sense of sustainable 
equilibrium. In this respect, the “behavioural” concepts of equilibrium exchange rate seem to be 
better suited, as they could be expected to identify some “equilibrium” given the set of current 
fundamental determinants.  
Apparently behavioural approaches are not ideal either. The assessment of current 
misalignment depends on how well a given theory or set of theories capture exchange rate 
dynamics. For instance, a BEER model may indicate a misspecification or omitted variable 
problem9 rather than the misalignment stemming form random effects (i.e., everything which is not 
explained by the “true” model). In practice it is difficult to choose an exact form of the exchange 
rate determination model. However, if the estimated model demonstrates good explanatory 
properties, then the assessment should be less controversial.  
Another possible theoretical framework for selection of the conversion rates is the PPP model. 
Although it was criticised as a good metric of exchange rate misalignment (see Williamson (1994b) 
and MacDonald (2000)), it poses some theoretical characteristics that make it attractive for the 
                                                  
8 See Section 6 for further discussion of this issue. 
9 An estimation of eclectic BEER models poses less risk of omitted variable problem than estimation of one specific 
and narrowly defined model of exchange rate determination (like uncovered interest rate parity or PPP). Similar point 
was made by Stein (1999).  
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choice of conversion rates. The PPP refers to the international arbitrage that equilibrates 
internationally prices of tradables. In a sense it is a behavioural concept which reflects the current 
state of economies and does not refer to a theory-underpinned steady-state equilibrium. As was 
argued above this feature makes it a good theoretical concept of selecting the conversion 
exchange rates. On the other hand, for this particular reason PPP has been disregarded as 
“fundamental” equilibrium exchange rate benchmark. However, in a theoretical world with perfect 
competition, no obstacles to trade, transport costs, etc. PPP exchange rate could be viewed as 
“fair” value guaranteeing the international arbitrage.  
5.  Equilibrium exchange rate models in practice  
In the previous section it was conclude that “behavioural” concepts of equilibrium exchange 
rate seems more appropriate for the selection of the euro conversion rates upon EMU accession. 
Having a proper and meaningful theoretical framework, however, is not sufficient for providing real 
policy recommendations. It must also be operational. Thus, in this section problems with testing 
and practical application of theoretical concepts of equilibrium exchange rates are discussed.  
In many papers in which real equilibrium exchange rates10 are estimated, the real (effective) 
exchange rate based on consumer prices is used. In such cases, the real exchange rate (q) could 
be disaggregated: 
 




T) - α (pNT - pT) .            ( 1 )  
 
The first term is the real exchange rate deflated with prices of tradables only (pT and p
*
T) – qT, 
and the latter two are a ratio of relative prices between two countries (pT and p
*
T – are domestic 
and foreign prices of tradables, and pNT and p
*
NT non-tradables, respectively). This disaggregation 
is derived based on domestic and foreign inflation equations given by: 
 
p = (1-α) pT + α pNT      and     p
* = (1- β) p
*
T + β p
*
NT.      (2) 
 
α and β are shares of non-tradable prices in the overall price index11. The disaggregation in 
equation (1) highlights two distinctive effects – one concerns the competitiveness in the tradable 
sector (as measured by real exchange rate) and the second a relative internal prices ratio. If one is 
mostly interested in international competitiveness (as discussed in Section 3), than the analysis of 
qT should be the main focus12.  
                                                  
10 For instance, MacDonald and Wojcik (2003), and Alberola et al. (1999). 
11 For the sake of simplicity in many applications this issue is ignored and the shares are implicitly assumed to be 
the same. In estimations the constant is ignored. 
12 There are, however, models for which changes in relative prices do matter for international competitiveness. By 
incorporating a distribution sector (non-tradables services) into production of tradables, they allow for the impact of non-
tradables prices on competitiveness of tradables (for further details see MacDonald and Ricci (2001) or Lee and Tang 
(2003)). These issues will be discussed in more details in the latter part of the paper.   
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In the short run under floating exchange rate regimes, changes in nominal exchange rate could 
be very abrupt and hard to explain. Large shifts in nominal exchange rates could impact 
significantly on the economy if price rigidities exist. For instance, a significant nominal appreciation 
of domestic currency may lead in the short run to contraction in profit margins, employment, wages 
and output. High volatility of nominal exchange rates and price rigidities gave rise to the stylised 
fact that nominal exchange rates are key drives of changes in real exchange rates under floating 
regimes. Figures in Annex 3 prove that this is the case for acceding countries. 
Thus, under free floating regimes it seems that the main problem of testing exchange rate 
models and explaining changes in real exchange rates lies in the determination of nominal 
exchange rates – especially in the short and medium run. Against this background, the empirical 
finding by Meese and Rogoff (1983) can be quiet discouraging. They tested forecasting properties 
of various exchange rate models13 by comparing out-of-sample forecasts based on the actual 
values of explanatory variables with a random walk forecast. It was found that in the short-run 
(over 1 to 12-month horizon) the latter is far better in terms of forecast accuracy than any of the 
exchange rate models available at that time. The development of new models and their forecast 
tests in 1980s and 1990s did not change much the result. The structural models proved to forecast 
better only in the long run – beyond one year (Rogoff, 2001). On the other hand, under fixed 
exchange rate regimes the main challenge in understanding moves in real exchange rates lies in 
explaining movements in relative prices of non-tradables and tradables.  
In addition, modelling exchange rate determination in the case of acceding countries may 
prove difficult due to the fact that there are very few cases of pure free float. Consequently, very 
few observations could be identified when nominal exchange rates (and in turn real) have been 
fully stochastic variables determined by market forces and not steered by deliberate exchange rate 
interventions. In this context econometric investigation of non-stochastic variables should not be 
expected to render robust results.  
 
Table 2. Correlation between real euro exchange rate and relative prices – flexible regimes 
Country CZE  HUN  POL  ROM  SLK  SLO 
Correlation coef.  0.008  0.062 0.422 0.453 0.461 -0.083 
Period  94:1 03:4  96:1 03:4  94:1 03:4  98:1 03:4  96:1 03:4  94:1 03:4 
Source: Author’s calculations base on IFS-IMF, OECD and national sources. 
Notes: Correlations are based on annual growth rates for quarterly data. The real euro exchange rate is defined as 
nominal euro exchange rate multiplied by euro-zone inflation and divided by domestic inflation. Relative prices  
are defined as ratio of domestic to euro-zone relative prices (non-tradables vs. tradables). Tradable prices are 
defined in terms of producer prices in manufacturing and non-tradable prices as consumer prices of services.  
 
 
                                                  
13 They tested flexible-price monetary model (Frenkel-Bilson), the sticky-price monetary model (Dornbusch-Frankel), 
and the Hooper-Morton model.   
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Table 3. Correlation between real euro exchange rate and relative prices – fixed pegs 
Country EST  LAT  LIT 
Correlation coef.  0.898  0.641  0.682 
Period  94:1 03:2  94:1 03:2  94:1 03:2 
Source: Author’s calculations base on IFS-IMF, OECD and national sources. 
Notes: Correlations are based on annual growth rates for quarterly data. The real euro exchange rate is defined as 
nominal euro exchange rate multiplied by euro-zone inflation and divided by domestic inflation. Relative prices are 
defined as ratio of domestic to euro-zone relative prices (non-tradables vs. tradables). Tradable prices are defined 
in terms of producer prices in manufacturing and non-tradable prices as consumer prices of services.  
Given the above considerations, it can be argued that for countries with more flexible 
exchange rate regimes, approximation of real exchange rates with relative prices14 is a very poor 
proxy. This fact is evident in figures in Annex 3. On the other hand, in countries with fixed 
exchange rate, there is a higher correlation between changes in relative prices and real exchange 
rates deflated with consumer prices.  
At this point it should be noted that at the beginning of the transition process in CEE countries 
high inflation was prevalent. This applied to both tradables and non-tradables prices and was 
attributable to price liberalisation and fiscal imbalances monetised by central banks. During this 
period, high inflation was the key driver of real exchange rates (those defined in terms of consumer 
price index as well as prices of tradables only). Thus, the real appreciation of exchange rates at the 
beginning of the transition period could be a different phenomenon, difficult to explain with 
standard exchange rate models15.  
Most of empirical studies in empirical estimations use a common numeraire currency for 
bilateral exchange rates16. This contradicts to the global consistency condition mentioned in 
Section 3. In the case of acceding countries this might seem to be less of a problem as trade and 
financial links are largely limited to the euro zone (see Table A.2 and Table A.3). However, in case 
of countries with more diversified foreign links in terms of trading partners, estimation of one 
bilateral exchange rate without taking into account the rest of the world may lead to biased results. 
For instance while testing PPP hypothesis there are no reasons to expect that domestic prices of 
tradables converge to prices in only one country, if trade relations are maintained with many other 
countries.  
Given these general conceptual problems with estimating equilibrium exchange rate models, 
operational problems of particular models will be discussed. One problem with BEER models is 
that they are highly data demanding – both with regard to data coverage and length of time series. 
An estimation of these models boils down to finding long-run elasticities. Given the common 
presence of non-stationary time series, these elasticities are estimated in the cointegration 
                                                  
14 The relative prices are most commonly explained by the Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson (HBS) effect, however, there 
are two other explanations provided in Bergstrand (1991). These are the demand effect and relative endowments in 
factors of production.  
15 The appreciation of real exchange rates in CEE economies at the beginning of transition period was investigated 
in Grafe and Wyplosz (1997).  
16 This is the case among others of Lee and Tang (2003) and MacDonald and Wojcik (2003). Some exceptions to 
this treatment are Alberola et al. (1999) and Rahn (2003).  
                                                               Studies & Analyses No. 269 – Lukasz W. Rawdanowicz 
  17
framework (either in VAR or single equation models). Models are usually estimated using annual or 
quarterly time series. As comparable and consistent data set for acceding countries is available 
only from the beginning of the 1990s and if one wants to include several explanatory variables in a 
model, econometric robustness of such estimations could be questioned. The problem of weak 
power of unit root tests when tested variables are close to unit root and occurrence of structural 
breaks in the series do not make things easier (Maddala and Kim, 1998). This leads also to 
another practical problem of dealing with a mixture of stationary and non-stationary variables in the 
cointegration analysis.  
The problem of short time series for estimation of equilibrium exchange models could be 
circumvented by application of panel techniques. Panel estimations have become recently a 
workhorse of empirical tests in international economics. As indicated in a survey by MacDonald 
(1998) panel estimations tend to render better results in terms of economic and statistical 
properties, than single-equation estimations. Recently, several methods of estimation of dynamic 
panel models have been popularised, in particular panel Dynamic OLS (Mark and Sul, 2002 and 
Kao and Chiang, 2000), Pooled Group Mean Estimator (Pesaran et al., 1999), panel Fully Modified 
OLS (Pedroni, 2001). These methods were employed for estimation of equilibrium exchange rates 
for selected CEE countries in Kim and Korhonen (2002) – PMGE, MacDonald and Wojcik (2003) – 
DOLS, and Rahn (2003) – FMOLS. 
However, given the aim of estimating a particular exchange rate for a given country, panel 
models although render more robust econometrically results, tend to ignore country-specific 
factors. Thus, they are better suited for providing evidence on some general economic theory than 
for assessing country-specific variables like it is the case of conversion rates selection. In addition, 
problems of stationarity and cointegration are further complicated in comparison to the time-series 
models (Pesaran, 2000, Maddala and Kim, 1998, and Pedroni, 1999). 
Estimation of simple PPP models is also subject to serious practical problems. Empirical 
investigation of the PPP hypothesis has been proliferating17. It seems that a consensus emerged 
that the PPP hypothesis is a long term phenomenon. Estimating and testing of PPP is usually done 
using time series of price indices as price level data is not easily available. Different models 
(absolute vs. relative PPP hypothesis) and tests (either testing stationarity of real exchange rates 
or estimating coefficients for relation between nominal exchange rates and corresponding price 
indices in a home country and foreign country) have been pursued. The most commonly quoted 
problems with difficulties in finding evidence for PPP hypothesis (see Cecchetti et al., 2000) relates 
to the distinction between tradables and non-tradables (which is far from clear in practice), tariff 
and non-tariff trade barriers, monopolistic practices for pricing to segmented markets, imperfectly 
competitive markets where changes in prices are costly, transport costs, and differences in indirect 
taxes.  
                                                  
17 For instance see: Rogoff (1996), Pedroni (2001), Moon and Perron (2002), Bayoumi and MacDonald (1998).  
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There is in addition one important aspect in testing of PPP – i.e. the distinction between 
exchange rate regimes. Given that the PPP refers primarily to international arbitrage and not to 
determination of nominal exchange rate per se, it seems more reasonably to expect to find evidence 
for PPP under fixed exchange rate regimes than under free floats. The arbitrage is less likely to occur 
when changes in nominal exchange rates are very volatile and unpredictable as international 
comparison of prices is more difficult and the arbitrage more risky18. In this respect, a market power 
to affect international prices should be also mentioned. Given small shares of acceding countries in 
European markets (see Table A.4), one should not expect a too significant impact of domestic prices 
in these countries on prices in the euro-zone economies. But the opposite causality seems to be 
more likely. This point relates also to the issue of exchange rate pass-through. In general, theoretical 
and empirical evidence (a more pervasive pricing-to-market effect in economies with monopolistic 
competition markets, and higher share of non-tradables in the structure of the economy and 
consumption) suggest a weaker pass-through (from changes in nominal exchange rates to inflation) 
in developed economies as opposed to developing countries19.  
Disregarding the problems of testing the PPP model using time series, in order to get some 
benchmark for the conversion rates a comparison of price levels could be undertaken. Data on 
comparable price levels for the EU and acceding countries are collected by Eurostat, however in 
practice, it is difficult to decide what basket of goods and services should be used. This choice is 
crucial for calculations of PPP exchange rates (see Table A.6 in Annex 2). The PPP exchange 
rates differ a lot depending on the particular category of goods and services being used. A similar 
sensitivity of PPP models have been also noted by Isard et al. (2001). Besides data on price levels 
is available with a significant time lag and revisions are a common practice20. This makes the PPP 
method unattractive for timely policy recommendations.  
It is interesting to note that for almost all countries and categories of goods and services the 
PPP exchange rates were stronger than (i.e. below) annual market exchange rates (see Table 
A.6). It should be also noted that in general categories of goods that seems to be more tradable 
(for instance durable goods or investment in machinery and equipment) are closer to market 
exchange rates than other categories. This common pattern could suggest some systemic reason 
behind these differences. One hypothesis could refer to the input of non-tradable prices (the 
concept discussed among others by MacDonald and Ricci (2001) and Lee and Tang (2003)). In 
countries which have lower relative costs of services, one could expect lower (observed) price of 
tradables – if cost of services are believed to consist a part of observed tradable prices21. From 
Table A.6 it is evident that relative price levels of services in acceding countries are much lower 
                                                  
18 For instance, Wei and Parsley (1995) find a positive relation between deviation from PPP and nominal exchange 
rate volatility.  
19 These aspects require an empirical investigation on its own, which lies beyond the scope of this paper. 
20 See Eurostat web site for more details.  
21 See Annex 1 for mathematical prove of this hypothesis.  Price levels collected in PPP surveys in the joint 
Eurostat-OECD project refer to final consumer prices and thus should be expect to contain the component of services 
(for instance retail trade mark-ups, transport costs, etc.).  
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than those for goods (as indicated by more appreciated exchange rates). In addition, a positive and 
close to 1 correlation coefficient between PPP exchange rates for services and those for goods 
was found22. These facts give support to the hypothesis of the impact of non-tradables prices on 
price of tradables in the sample of 12 acceding countries. This is consistent with Lee and Tang 
(2003) who found empirical evidence for the impact of non-tradable processing on prices of 
tradables. Thus, it should be noted the PPP exchange rates as a benchmark for conversion rates 
are downward biased (i.e. indicate too appreciated exchange rates), however little can be said 
precisely about the magnitude of this effect.   
Finally, it should be mentioned that “fundamental” models of equilibrium exchange rates, 
although disregarded as suitable for setting the euro conversion rates, also suffer from practical 
drawbacks. A calibration of FEER model or estimation of NATREX and PEER models requires 
sometimes arbitrary assumptions and are subject to some uncertainty given the problems with 
definition of variables and finding corresponding real data. In particular, the FEER models require 
using the non-observable variables of potential output and as noted by Bayoumi et al. (1994) and 
IMF (1998) plausible estimates of FEER may vary quite substantially23. The most common way of 
testing NATREX models shares the same problems as in the case BEER models.  
6.  Guidelines for choosing the euro conversion rates 
From the discussion so far we have learned that despite a number of equilibrium exchange 
rate models, not all of them are appropriate for choosing the conversion rates upon the accession 
to EMU. On top of this, all of these concepts suffer from important operational problems casting 
doubts on the precision of their point estimates of equilibrium exchange rates. This critique does 
not mean, however, that all these models and their estimations should be discarded entirely. Still, 
some useful information could be elicited if only interpreted carefully24.  
So what are other considerations that should be taken into account and could help in making 
the decision on the conversion rates? First, as pointed by IMF (1998) a complete assessment of 
exchange rate misalignment should not be based simply on model estimates, but take into account 
a broader range of macroeconomic issues like policy-mix, structural factors, stage of development, 
etc. If one is interested primarily in international competitiveness than a more detailed analysis of 
this issue could be conducted. This would involve investigation of different determinants of wages, 
productivity, prices of other production inputs, as well as other potential factors driving nominal 
exchange rates – capital inflows, interest rate differential, etc.  
                                                  
22 These correlations were calculated for 12 EU acceding counties, and the results were little changed if different 
categories of goods and services were used.  
23 See Rawdanowicz (2002) for operational problems with estimation of FEER. 
24 For a survey of empirical estimations of equilibrium exchange rate for selected accession countries refer to Egert 
(2003). 
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Disregarding problems with empirical measurement of equilibrium exchange rates and ensuing 
misalignments, another practical issue arises. What should be done if the misalignment is 
diagnosed? How the equilibrium could be achieved and what are the implications for the choice of 
the euro conversion rates? Theoretical models do not give clear answers for these questions. In 
the case of BEER models, the current misalignment is defined in terms of model residuals, which 
may stem either from “temporary” shocks or misspecification of the model. For “fundamental” 
NATERX models, it seems that nothing is to be done as the long run equilibrium is achieved 
“naturally” (i.e. via defined interactions with other variables in the model), unless long-term 
fundamental determinants are changed. In the case of FEER no dynamics is explained and no 
clear implications on adjustment to equilibrium can be learned. It should be also mentioned that as 
fundamentals and some exogenous parameters in BEER and NATREX models change, the long-
run equilibrium could change as well. Thus, reaching the exchange rate equilibrium could be like 
chasing a constantly changing benchmark.  
Given these considerations, setting a nominal euro parity based on the equilibrium value does 
not solve the problem of reaching this equilibrium. Shifting a nominal exchange rate could not be 
enough to achieve the internal and external equilibrium for the entire economy. Although one can 
expect some impact of nominal exchange rates on fundamentals like productivity, saving and 
investment ratios, consumption, public debt, etc., pinning down the exact channels in a dynamic 
environment with price adjustments and other shocks to the economy looks very difficult. Besides 
one could expect some lags in the convergence to equilibrium. Only in the PPP model, the 
adjustment in nominal exchange rate at given point in time that leads to price levels equalisation 
between any two countries can consequently restore equilibrium.  
While deciding for a change in nominal exchange rate upon accession to ERM II/EMU, 
consequences of this change should be addressed. In this respect a potential nominal shock to the 
economy and reactions of financial markets are discussed. The first issue primarily refers to 
identification of impacts on trade flows, firms’ profits, employment, etc. According to a conventional 
macroeconomic analysis, a too strong exchange rate spurs recessionary effects and the 
undervalued currency expansionary ones. It is often the case that, not only the mere fact of 
misalignment is important, but its magnitude. One could expect a non-linear relation between 
nominal exchange rates and real performance25. But also price adjustments and revaluation of 
foreign currency denominated assets and liabilities should be taken into account. Understanding 
this problem is very important in the context of EMU membership. Acceding countries will have to 
meet Maastricht criteria, so while setting conversion rates other macro objectives than simply 
correcting the nominal exchange rate misalignment should have been taken into account (for 
instance inflation, interest rates, and debt targets). 
In the case of acceding countries there might be arguments for asymmetric effects of choosing a 
“too strong” than a “too weak” conversion exchange rate. Given the importance of export markets for 
                                                  
25 For further discussion of these issues refer to Collins and Razin (1997). They found out empirically that only very 
high overvaluation leads to slower GDP growth, and medium and high under-valuation to higher growth.   
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the total economy for each acceding country (as proxied by shares in total GDP – see Table A.4) on 
the one side and the euro zone on the other side, as well as a potential power to affect international 
prices, the effects of potential short-term disadvantage in competitiveness seem to be far less acute for 
the euro zone than for acceding countries. In terms of potentially higher inflation induced by a 
depreciation of domestic currency (a “too weak” conversion rate variant), if countries do not suffer from 
significant macroeconomic imbalances and purse stable and low-inflation oriented policies (the latter is 
currently the case in many acceding countries), this option should not pose major threats. Nonetheless, 
more simulations of these effects for each country separately would be needed for more justified and 
robust conclusions. The investigation of these issues could be also augmented by the assessment of a 
position in the business cycle and expectations for monetary conditions in the EMU just after the 
accession. Recommendations for choosing a weak or strong conversion rate should be different if a 
country is in a boom phase and euro-zone interest rates are expected to be less restrictive (for instance 
due to inflation differences), than in the opposite situation.  
Financial markets reactions and expectations are also potentially important aspects. Given that 
acceding countries must stay at least for 2 years in ERM II without devaluing the central parity, this 
gives some scope for an adjustment in nominal exchange rate. If the desired nominal exchange 
rate differs significantly from the current level of exchange rates, then credible announcement of 
central parity in ERM II may allow for a gradual convergence to this rate. As Reluga and Szczurek 
(2002) pointed out, it is very likely that the market exchange rate will converge to the announced 
nominal exchange rate parity, if this announcement is fully credible26. The nominal convergence of 
exchange rates was clearly visible among others in the case of Spain and Portugal prior to their 
accession to EMU (see Annex 3). 
However, if financial markets realise that the choice of a weak exchange rate is simply a way to 
deal with some other structural problems in the economy, then the undermined confidence of foreign 
investors could cause more harm than good27. An illustrative example is the Hungarian case with the 
devaluation of the forint central parity in June 2003. This move was intended to ease the appreciation 
pressure for domestic manufacturers. However, the loss in competitiveness was not only attributable to 
the strong nominal forint exchange rate, but also to buoyant growth in wages (primarily in the public 
sector, but in manufacturing as well). In addition, Hungary pursued loose fiscal policy which was 
responsible for fuelling wages, household consumption and in turn inflation. After the realignment of the 
forint central parity against the euro on June 4, the market reaction was very nervous and the forint 
depreciated significantly (see Section 2). When the forint approached 270 HUF/EUR the National Bank 
of Hungary decided to raise interest rates by 100 basis points to 7.5%.  This measure did not render 
the expected effects and monetary policy was tightened again on June 19. That time by 200 basis 
points up to 9.5%. In the aftermath, market yields and the forint exchange rate started to stabilise. The 
forint exchange rate, however, still remained below the central parity (5%-10% below the parity – prior 
                                                  
26 Such conclusions are based on Krugman (1988) and Ichikawa et al. (1990) models of a credible exchange rate 
band. 
27 The mechanism here could be compared to the second generation models of currency crises.   
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to the realignment in 2003 it stayed below 10% of the central parity). In this case, the realignment of the 
central policy took place at the cost of higher interest rates, and did not solve the problem of fast growth 
in wages and international competitiveness.  
7. Conclusions 
This paper deals with the choice of nominal conversion rates upon the accession to EMU for 
its prospective members. It has been stressed that pegging national currencies to the euro is only 
one of many aspects of EMU membership and its consequences should be relatively short-lived. 
Trade competitiveness issues are the main concerns behind adjustments in nominal exchange 
rates, however other determinants of international competitiveness should not be ignored. A 
general view is that the central parity should reflect some equilibrium position. It has been argued 
that despite several theories of equilibrium exchange rate not all of them are useful for the real 
policy choice of the nominal conversion rate. The selection of a particular theoretical model 
determines interpretation of potential exchange rate misalignment and policy implications. It has 
been argued that BEER and PPP models seem to be better theoretical concepts for the selection 
of conversion rates, but they suffer from many estimation problems (like other concepts), which 
diminish their attractiveness for the practical policy decisions.  
The problems with choosing an appropriate theoretical framework of equilibrium exchange rate 
and the intrinsic uncertainty of equilibrium exchange rate estimates, gives support to the conjecture 
that the range of “optimal” conversion exchange rates is quiet wide and other issues must be taken 
into account when making this decision. Concerns about international competitiveness should be 
augmented by interactions of nominal exchange rates with other macro variables and other macro 
objectives (for instance inflation, interest rates, and debt targets in the context of Maastricht criteria). 
In addition, the role of financial markets was stressed and it was argued that it is not only 
important what exchange rate is chosen, but also how and in what circumstances. A smooth 
transition to the euro conversion rate and minimisation of risks of potential shocks to the economy 
should be the key concern behind the choice of the conversion rate. In this respect, 
recommendations for the selection of nominal conversion rates should be dependent on the 
current exchange rate regime. Given the lack of precise theoretical and empirical guidelines from 
equilibrium exchange rate models, the countries with fixed exchange rate regimes (Estonia, 
Lithuania, Bulgaria, Latvia and Malta) seems to be better off to leave their current fixing rates 
unchanged (see Table 1). In this group of countries, the recommendation is not that straightforward 
for Latvia and Malta. These countries peg to the basket of currencies. Consequently, at some point 
the basket should be changed to contain the euro only.  
Similarly in countries, which currently adopt ERMII compatible exchange rate regimes 
(Hungary and Cyprus), no change in central parity should be administered if there is no sound 
evidence that the nominal exchange rate is the factor hurting macroeconomic performance.  
A more problematic choice is for countries with more flexible exchange rates regimes (Poland, 
the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, and Romania) as there is no existing nominal reference  
                                                               Studies & Analyses No. 269 – Lukasz W. Rawdanowicz 
  23
point. For these countries a more detailed and country-specific analysis of the issued discussed in 
this paper should be undertaken. In particular the consequences of changes in a nominal 
exchange rate on trade competitiveness, inflation, and debt repayments should be taken into 
account. The same recommendations apply to Slovenia with its de facto crawling peg regime.  
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Annex 1. Prices of services vs. prices of goods and PPP exchange 
rates 
If the observed consumer prices could be split between internal price (i.e. the true price of 
tradable good only) and cost of services included in the “observed” price: 
 
  p = pI + s      (1) 
 
then the corresponding PPP exchange rate for “pure” tradable is given by: 
 
 e I = pI / pI*       (2)    (* – foreign country) 
 
and for “observed” prices of tradables: 
 
  e = (pI + s)/ (pI* + s*)    (3) 
 
Then rewriting (3) we can obtain: 
 
   p I - e pI* = e s* - s    (4) 
 
Substituting the first term in equation (4) with equation (2) we obtain: 
 
 p I*(eI – e) = e s* - s    (5) 
 
Because (e s* - s) > 0 (e > es = s/s* – this is the PPP exchange rate for services and it is in fact 
lower that for tradables – see Table A.6), eI > e (if pI* > 0). Thus, the “observed” PPP exchange 
rate if believed to contain cost of non-tradable services by definition must be more appreciated that 
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Annex 2. Statistical data 
Table A. 1. Classification of exchange rate regimes in acceding countries 
  Exchange rate regime  Currency  Features 
Currency Board 
Bulgaria  Currency board to the euro  Bulgarian lev  Introduced in 1997 
Estonia  Currency board to the euro  Estonian kroon  Introduced in 1992 
Lithuania  Currency board to the euro  Lithuanian litas  Introduced in 1994; re-pegged from the US dollar to the 
euro in February 2002 
Conventional fixed peg 
Latvia  Peg to the SDR  Latvian lat  Exchange rate band +/-1% 
Malta  Peg to a basket  Maltese lira  Currency basket (euro, US dollar, pound sterling): 
exchange rate band +/-0.25% 
Unilateral peg to the euro with +/-15% fluctuation band 
Cyprus  Peg to the euro, with +/-15% 
fluctuation bands  Cyprus pound   
Hungary  Peg to the euro, with +/-15% 
fluctuation bands  Hungarian forint  Direct inflation targeting 
Managed float 
Romania  Managed float  Romanian leu  Currency basket (US dollar, euro) is used informally as 
reference 
Slovakia Managed  float  Slovakian  koruna   
Slovenia  Managed float  Slovenian tolar  Prominent role for monetary aggregates; the euro is used 
informally as reference currency 
Independent float 
Czech Republic  Free float  Czech koruna  Direct inflation targeting 
Poland  Free float  Polish zloty  Direct inflation targeting 
Source: Global Britain, June 2003, www.globalbritain.org  
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Table A. 2. Export shares in acceding countries, 2002 (% of total exports) 
  AC10 AC12 EU12 EU15 EU22 EU25 EU27 
BUL  3.4  6.0  51.5 55.2 54.9 58.6 61.2 
CZE 16.3 17.4 61.8 68.2 78.0 84.5 85.7 
CYP  1.8  3.3  18.5 38.2 20.3 40.0 41.5 
EST 13.4 13.4 41.5 60.0 54.8 73.3 73.3 
HUN 6.7  9.5 68.6  74.4 75.3 81.1 83.9 
LAT  17.3 17.3 30.2 61.3 47.6 78.6 78.6 
LIT  23.1 23.2 25.8 47.8 48.9 70.9 71.0 
MAL  3.7  4.3  34.7 43.6 38.4 47.3 47.9 
POL 11.1 12.0 59.0 69.3 70.1 80.4 81.3 
ROM 6.0  7.7  62.0 67.9 68.0 73.9 75.7 
SLK  29.3 30.6 56.2 59.9 85.5 89.3 90.5 
SLO  7.5  8.5  58.0 62.6 65.5 70.1 71.1 
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF. 
Notes: The shares refer to exports (only goods) of the countries listed in the first column to country-block listed in the first 
row as a ratio to total exports. AC10 acceding countries (CZE, CYP, EST, HUN, LAT, LIT, MAL, POL, SLK, SLO); 
AC12 – acceding countries (AC10) and accession countries (BUL and ROM); EU12 – euro zone countries; EU15 
– European Union countries; EU22 = EU12 + AC10; EU25 = EU15 + AC10; EU27 = EU15 + AC12. 
Table A. 3. Import shares in acceding countries, 2002 (% of total imports) 
  AC10 AC12 EU12 EU15 EU22 EU25 EU27 
BUL  5.4  7.8  45.2 49.8 50.7 55.2 57.6 
CZE 12.5 12.6 65.5 71.9 78.0 84.4 84.5 
CYP  1.3  1.8  39.6 50.4 40.9 51.7 52.2 
EST  9.1  9.2  38.8 51.8 47.9 60.9 61.1 
HUN 6.9  8.1 53.3  57.9 60.3 64.8 66.0 
LAT  23.2 23.5 39.9 52.6 63.1 75.8 76.0 
LIT  10.4 10.7 34.9 44.3 45.4 54.7 55.0 
MAL  1.3  2.5  43.9 52.0 45.1 53.3 54.5 
POL  7.9  8.3  52.8 61.4 60.7 69.3 69.7 
ROM 8.9  9.9  52.5 57.4 61.4 66.3 67.3 
SLK  21.6 21.9 46.0 49.8 67.6 71.4 71.7 
SLO  8.5  9.7  63.6 67.7 72.1 76.2 77.4 
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF. 
Notes: The shares refer to imports (only goods) of the countries listed in the first column from country-block listed in the 
first row as a ratio to total imports. AC10 acceding countries (CZE, CYP, EST, HUN, LAT, LIT, MAL, POL, SLK, 
SLO); AC12 – acceding countries (AC10) and accession countries (BUL and ROM); EU12 – euro zone countries; 
EU15 – European Union countries; EU22 = EU12 + AC10; EU25 = EU15 + AC10; EU27 = EU15 + AC12.  
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Table A. 4. Shares of exports in GDP, 2002 
  Total EU12 EU15 
BUL  32.5 16.8 18.0 
CZE  43.2 26.7 29.5 
CYP  9.6 1.8 3.7 
EST  61.7 25.6 37.0 
HUN  45.8 31.4 34.1 
LAT 23.8  7.2  14.6 
LIT 33.2  8.6  15.9 
MAL  58.0 20.1 25.3 
POL  19.0 11.2 13.2 
ROM  24.9 15.4 16.9 
SLK  53.3 29.9 32.0 
SLO  41.8 24.2 26.1 
     AC12 
EU12       1.6 
Source: Direction of Trade Statistics, IMF and ECB. 
Note: The shares (exports of goods to GDP) refer to exports of the countries listed in the first column to country-block 
listed in the first row. 
Table A. 5. Foreign debt, 2002 
  Foreign debt 
(1) 
Foreign debt 




(1) / (3)  (2) / (3) 
BUL 7782  946  15563  50.0  6.1 
CZE 13449  5727  69509  19.3  8.2 
CYP 9533  3993  10135  94.1  39.4 
EST 1731  2299  6503  26.6  35.3 
HUN 21266  9057  65843  32.3  13.8 
LAT  1667 803 8403 19.8  9.6 
LIT 3001  1444 13783  21.8  10.5 
MAL  6089 3347 3863 157.6 86.6 
POL 38925  13109  189275  20.6  6.9 
ROM 8914  2397  45749  19.5  5.2 
SLK 6170  2819  23686  26.1  11.9 
SLO 6383  1464  21996  29.0  6.7 
Source: Foreign debt – Joint BIS-IMF-OECD-World Bank statistics on external debt; GDP – IFS, IMF. 
Notes: Foreign debt – the stock at the end of 2002 in million US dollars. It is a sum of: A  Bank loans, B  Debt securities 
issued abroad, C  Brady  bonds, D  Non-bank trade credits, E  Multilateral claims, F  Official bilateral loans (DAC 
creditors). Foreign debt within 1 year is a sum of H  Debt securities issued abroad – due within a year, I  Non-
bank trade credits – due within a year, and G  Liabilities to banks – due within a year. GDP in current prices 
converted to US dollars at annual average market exchange rates.   
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Table A. 6. PPP exchange rates, 1999 (national currency per euro) 
  CZE  HUN  POL  SLK  BG EE LV LT  RO  SI  MT CY  EURO12 
Market exchange rate in 1999  36.83  252.65 4.23  44.07 1.96 15.64 0.62  4.26 16335.30 193.65 0.425 0.578  0.939 
Total  goods  21.71  156.01 2.66 23.77 0.81 10.21  0.43 2.69 6948.41  157.41  0.359  0.460 1.062 
Consumer goods  22.20  154.27 2.69  22.87  0.83  9.58 0.42 2.63 7068.13  163.45  0.375  0.510 1.084 
Non durable goods  20.96  147.33 2.52  21.82  0.80  9.12 0.38 2.46 6849.81  165.98  0.371  0.476 1.132 
Semi durable goods  22.64  148.35 2.71  22.44  0.79 10.65 0.55  2.97 4923.20 157.15 0.340 0.483  1.119 
Durable goods  26.84  192.44 3.56  28.91  0.99  10.42 0.51  3.08 10771.04 159.70 0.425 0.682  0.932 
Capital goods  21.69  162.80 2.63  25.66  0.77  11.81 0.45  2.96 6887.54 151.85 0.338 0.385  1.030 
Food and non-alcoholic beverages  18.30  137.06 2.34  22.50  0.84 9.68 0.42 2.56 7186.38 186.66 0.384 0.489  0.990 
Alcoholic beverages, tobacco and 
narcotics  23.94  156.48 2.96 21.61 0.74 10.83 0.54  3.16 7710.40 139.57  0.602  0.641 0.820 
Clothing and footwear  21.65  144.96 2.50  20.15  0.80 10.26 0.54  2.82 4072.66 144.81 0.330 0.456  1.296 
Furnishing, households Equipment, 
routine household maintenance  20.71 144.63 2.56  21.87  0.54  9.16  0.38  2.37 5415.47 131.56  0.371  0.466 0.949 
 Transport  21.87  189.36 2.82  20.23  0.90  9.35 0.45 2.48 8077.79  155.36  0.429  0.492 1.076 
 Machinery and equipment  30.12  205.47 3.58  35.50  1.23 14.32 0.54  3.58 11085.03 181.70 0.434 0.564  0.966 
Total  services  9.82 73.09 1.40 8.68 0.33 4.58 0.17 1.00 3319.87  103.51 0.29 0.38  0.771 
Consumer  services  11.03  87.05 1.62 9.95 0.42 5.48 0.21 1.17 4496.40 112.89 0.37  0.39  0.784 
Government services  8.54  60.35  1.16  7.55  0.24 3.66 0.12 0.83 2109.20 91.83 0.21 0.38  0.753 
Collective  services  10.78  74.27 1.32 9.06 0.23 3.98 0.14 0.97 2229.36 96.83 0.22 0.34  0.803 
Individual  services  7.31 51.29 1.04 6.75 0.24 3.39 0.11 0.74 1996.78 88.15 0.20 0.41  0.698 
Source: PPP exchange rates – Eurostat and OECD, market exchange rates (national currency per euro, annual average) – IFS, IMF. 
Notes: Exchange rates refer to domestic currency per euro, but in case of EURO12 it is the euro per US dollar.  
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Annex 3. Figures 
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Source: IFS-IMF, ECB, and national sources. 
Note: EUR_xxx – nominal euro exchange rate and REUR1_xxx – real euro exchange rate (deflated with consumer 
prices). 
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Figure 3. Peseta-euro exchange rate (daily quotations) 
Source: Reluga and Szczurek (2002). 
 
Figure 4. Escudo-euro exchange rate (daily quotations) 
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